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Wilhelm Peekhaus†
All that may come to my knowledge in the exercise of my Neill’s model of privacy. Aside from providing the neces-
profession or outside my profession or in daily commerce sary conceptual framework for the paper that will help
with men, which ought not to be spread abroad, I will keep delineate between privacy and personal data protection,secret and will never reveal.
Neill’s model will be adapted to develop a pri-
– Hippocratic Oath, circa 4th century B.C. vacy–personal data protection continuum, on which the
various legislative devices will be positioned. The analysis
of the various statutory mechanisms will be limited to a
descriptive discussion designed to conceptualize theIntroduction degree to which contemporary legislation is more aptly
construed as protective of privacy or personal data.he Hippocratic Oath, which at some level is prob-
Though some attention will be devoted to discussing theT ably familiar to a large portion of the population,
analytic advantages of Neill’s model in responding toactually articulates a tension in contemporary society
such a query, a normative assessment of her model or thebetween the call for privacy rights and claims that access
various acts is beyond the scope of this paper. Theto medical data is necessary for the benefit of all of
research questions driving this paper include the fol-society. The former is a position espoused by libertarians
lowing three:and the latter is championed by communitarians. The
(i) Considering Neill’s ontology of privacy rights,libertarian applauds the Oath’s insistence that the med-
are the Organization for Economic Co-opera-ical practitioner keep secrets; the communitarian sup-
tion and Development’s Guidelines on theports the notion, present in the Oath, that there is infor-
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flowsmation that ought to be spread about. This tension
of Personal Data2 and the European Unionmirrors the inevitable discordance between privacy
Directive on the Protection of Individuals with(understood in the context of the Oath as secrets relating
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data andto an individual) and access (to the information that
on the Free Movement of Such Data3 bestought to be spread abroad) that continues to be reflected
characterized as protective of privacy or per-in contemporary policy discussions about the privacy of
sonal data?personal information.
Some of the existing literature concerning the pri- (ii) Do the various provincial health information
vacy of health information seems to suggest that medical protection Acts go beyond the Personal Infor-
information has a particularly special nature; either mation and Protection of Electronic Docu-
through its oft-cited association with dignity or the need ments Act4 such that health information pro-
for its ‘‘unobstructed’’ use by health care practitioners for tection might better be considered more
a variety of reasons. 1 It is against such a backdrop that about privacy than personal data protection?
this paper will review and compare a number of legisla-
(iii) Which are aligned with Neill’s model?tive mechanisms that have been designed to meet the
challenge of safeguarding the privacy of personal infor- In order to respond to these questions, the first part
mation without completely hindering the continued of the essay will be devoted to explicating Neill’s
flow of information required by economic and health ontology of privacy. The paper will then consider the
care systems. An attempt will be made to situate the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
Canadian legal environment in respect of privacy legisla- ment’s Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and
tion within a suitable theoretical framework: Elizabeth Transborder Flows of Personal Data and the European
†Doctoral Candidate in the Faculty of Information and Media Studies, at the University of Western Ontario. The author would like to thank Dr. Margaret
Ann Wilkinson, from the University of Western Ontario, for her valuable and constructive comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Thanks are also due to
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Union Directive on the Protection of Individuals with springs the creation and bestowal of rights. Morality
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the therefore serves to rationally and metaphorically recon-
Free Movement of Such Data in order to assess whether struct factual reality. In order to avoid criticism that met-
they protect privacy or personal data. The next section aphor cannot ground entitlement, Neill appeals to the
will engage in a comparative examination of the Cana- work of such scholars, as Lawrence Kohlberg, and Philip
dian federal Personal Information and Protection of Elec- Wheelwright, who has defended ‘‘the ontological status
tronic Documents Act and the four provincial health of radical metaphor . . . [as] a medium of fuller, riper
information protection Acts (Alberta, Saskatchewan, knowing’’. 7
Manitoba, and Ontario). Based upon this comparison, The dual ontological nature of Neill’s theory, which
attention will then turn toward an assessment of postulates rights as being both originally created and
whether the various statutes are concerned more with bestowed by society, rejects natural rights theory that
privacy or personal data protection, and where they fit in views rights as fixed objects given in nature that can be
the privacy debate based on Neill’s model. discovered and applied by humankind. Similar to
Lockean rights theorists, Neill asserts that the develop-
ment of rights is a gradual process by humans using
rational means, although she does reject the claim thatTheoretical Model of Privacy 
individuals contract to preserve natural rights. Instead,
efore examining the extent of legislative protection Neill posits that humans bestow rights upon oneB afforded to personal health information in Canada, another as a means of metaphorically expressing the
consideration must first turn toward the explication of a meaning of innate properties in their lives. By definition,
theoretical model capable of coherently defending she therefore also rejects the notion that humans are
claims to privacy. In Rites of Privacy and the Privacy born with rights. Rather humans, by virtue of birth, are
Trade, Elizabeth Neill sets herself the task of developing provided with the capacity to construct rights. By con-
a theoretical basis for the justification of privacy in the ceiving the right to privacy as both innate and culturally
context of our technologically advanced society. At the bestowed, Neill’s theoretical model is able to differen-
core of her theory is the question of the ontological tiate between circumstances in which privacy is a polit-
status of human dignity in relation to privacy, which ical, social, and individual necessity reflective of the
permits her to delimit the boundaries of legitimate pri- human dignity in which it is grounded and those in
vacy interests and rights. As she correctly points out, which claims to privacy stretch beyond any legitimate
much of the literature has been unable to determine connection to the dignity of the ‘‘sacred self’’. 8
definitively whether human dignity is an inherent char-
acteristic of humans or rather something that is con-
Legitimating the Right to Privacy ferred by society. 5 Indeed, without an unambiguous the-
oretical foundation, many of the definitions of privacy As Neill argues, the psychological natural properties
that depend upon appeals to human dignity crumble inherent in all individuals facilitate the autonomous pro-
like sandcastles with the rising tide. By considering the duction of thoughts as well as their protection, since a
notion of the ‘‘sacred self’’, which is posited to be that person exercises exclusive control over his communica-
part of the self integral to personhood, Neill is able to tion to others. All individuals can therefore be viewed as
move beyond this debate. innately possessing some degree of privacy. Privacy and
Neill construes human dignity not as being inborn autonomy are posited to factually exist as a property of
but rather as a ‘‘rationally constructed metaphor for people’s thoughts. In turn, the ability to conceal and
innate properties’’. 6 In developing her theory, Neill fur- determine which thoughts and aspects of one are
ther distinguishes between factual and metaphorical divulged to others influences the degree to which a
‘‘innateness’’; the former being something that is congen- person is perceived by others as being dignified. It there-
ital, whereas the latter is a construction that represents fore becomes clear how the conception of people as
the former properties. To further refine this distinction, innately private and autonomous gives rise to the notion
Neill differentiates between physical and psychological of individuals as being inherently dignified. Perhaps
natural properties, with the former reflecting subsistence more importantly, this conception derives from the per-
properties and the latter being comprised of an indi- ception of something actually possessed by humans. As
vidual’s private and autonomous nature that helps an Neill states, ‘‘it is a moral metaphor for a non-moral fact
individual attain a minimal level of psychological of non-physical human nature’’. 9 Put another way, once
security. Neill asserts that the production of thought humans, who are innately private and autonomous, per-
reflects privacy and autonomy at their most elemental ceive themselves as such, they develop a conception of
level. It is the privacy and autonomy of thought that themselves that metaphorically reflects the nature of
embodies a person’s perception of his or her innate pri- these natural properties. Once constructed, this moral
vacy and autonomy. It is thus from factually innate metaphor of dignity becomes factually inherent and
properties that society then develops a conception of notions of obligation attach to it. Thus it is not human
































































Personal Medical Information: Privacy or Personal Data Protection? 89
versal tendency to perceive people as dignified that In applying her model to questions of privacy pro-
forms the foundation for protecting human dignity as a tection, Neill distinguishes between infringement of an
right. By protecting privacy, society safeguards not only individual’s broad right to a private life and infringe-
the innate natural properties of individuals but also the ments of an individual’s narrow privacy rights to
emergent perception of humans as dignified. As opposed inherent privacy and human dignity. Broad privacy
to a number of other authors who seek to ground pri- rights arise as individuals seek to maintain a private life
vacy rights in human dignity, but never convincingly on the basis of the dignity to which society’s view of
make the connection, Neill’s theory reaches further back personhood gives them a right. These broader rights are
and effectively unpacks the concept as a deliberate con- protected through conventional fluctuating norms.
struction erected on innate facts, which thus supplies the Narrow privacy rights are the static symbolic protections
moral origin of rights; value and meaning attach to that defend the conception of human dignity in Neill’s
innate psychological properties by imposing value and ontology by making manifest the obligation that sym-
meaning on the moral metaphor that represents them. bolizes that dignity; i.e., the manifest-symbolic or third
The result is an emergent perception of humans as digni- level of Neill’s model. These narrow rights are thus safe-
fied, which, once generalized to include the duties of all guarded by natural, conventional static norms. Neill con-
individuals to all others, facilitates the cultural bestowal siders them to be conventional because they are cultur-
of rights. Indeed, in Neill’s theory, the conception of ally determined and natural since they are both locally
humans as inherently dignified serves as the moral meta- absolute and designed to preserve the conception of
phor for innate properties of privacy and autonomy and humans that is based upon innate qualities. While trans-
provides the foundation upon which a theoretical moral gressions of broad rights, or what Neill terms ‘‘trade
obligation to defend human dignity is constructed. It is transgressions’’, impinge on conventionally bestowed
from this moral obligation that concrete duties in the rights, infringements of narrow rights, which Neill refers
form of norms and rights are constructed. However, it is to as ‘‘rites transgressions’’, violate ‘‘innate privacy, indi-
important to remember that privacy and autonomy vidual dignity, or the universal conception of humans as
rights bestowed by society safeguard the moral ideal of dignified’’. 12
individual dignity, rather than the innate properties of
While society safeguards the basic conception ofindividual privacy and autonomy, which the metaphor
human dignity through static norms, individuals mayof human dignity represents.
attempt to have their entire persons viewed as sacred and
Thus, Neill’s model contains three levels, including therefore deserving of privacy protection. This, however,
the innate, the moral-metaphorical, and the manifest- is a mistake, according to Neill, because it conflates the
symbolic, all of which aid in the universal development privacy of a private life with privacy of the ‘‘sacred self’’
of natural rights. Once the rights are constructed, a and attempts to extend the ‘‘sacred self’’ beyond its
fourth level materializes: the level of the ‘‘rights trade’’. In inherent limits. The obligation that attaches to human
an attempt to secure a private life, individuals engage in dignity may only be applied to claims that derive from
what Neill alternately terms the ‘‘dignity trade’’ or the innate properties, which is why Neill labels any laws not
‘‘rights trade’’. 10 It is in this sphere that humans assert based on claims to protect dignity as fluctuating rather
claims to privacy, trade them in exchange for other than static norms. Nonetheless, Neill does argue that in
goods, or, at times, see them expropriated for the public some cases, static and fluctuating privacy norms are both
good. The moral legitimation for such claims is depen- required, in order to protect the human dignity upon
dent upon whether they derive from absolute static which moral culture is built. Given this, Neill asserts that
norms based on innate natural properties (the ‘‘sacred the criterion that should be applied when deciding
self’’) or from the ideal of dignity that grounds those whether an infringement of a privacy right is legitimate
norms. is the degree to which that right protects either the
‘‘sacred self’’ or society’s moral conception of the dignity
Applying the Model of humans. Put another way, decisions about what con-
As discussed above, the weakness of scholars, such as stitutes a legitimate claim to privacy must be decided by
Edward Bloustein, who attempt to legitimate privacy the degree to which they are grounded in an individual’s
rights through appeals to human dignity rests with their ideologically deep, or what she terms ‘‘untradeable’’,
failure to sufficiently explicate the concept of dignity, right of privacy and human dignity. Neill therefore
which often leads to attributing to it a factual innateness believes that policy analysis and legislative development
that assumes an almost mystical character undeserving of should be guided by concern for human dignity, and the
ontological scrutiny. 11 By conceiving of human dignity ideologically deep privacy rights that attach to this, rather
as a metaphor for innate privacy and autonomy and as than broader privacy claims. As she argues, ‘‘the potential
the basis upon which to construct duties, Neill not only violation of innate dignity rights is the only viable reason
addresses the limitations of previous theories, but also for a privacy right’’. 13 In order to determine whether an
offers a model capable of determining legitimate fluctu- interest merits protection, its origin must be traced back
ating rights with reference to the source of rights in through Neill’s structure of rights. Some norms deserve
































































90 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
ifest-symbolic level, while others may go right back to which she argues are inherently private because they
the very origin of rights to safeguard the fundamental reflect the thoughts, and thus the ‘‘mind’’ of an indi-
privacy and autonomy of the mind. Yet many norms, vidual, rather than just information about the mind.
while making claims to privacy and autonomy rights, Thoughts expressed in confidentiality to a counsellor
bear little relationship to symbolic or psychological provide immediate access to the ‘‘sacred self’’ and there-
properties and rights. As Neill asserts, many that fall fore warrant the protection offered by static privacy
within this category are often protective of economic rights. However, it should be pointed out that this anal-
interests masquerading as privacy concerns. ysis does not mean Neill is arguing against measures
designed to protect medical information, rather, that anyFrom this analytical standpoint, Neill concludes
such instruments would defend, under the rubric of pri-that medical databases, when used for their intended
vacy, interests other than inherent privacy and dignity.purposes and with adequate safeguards against unautho-
rized access, do not violate static privacy norms. This According to Neill, human dignity is a metaphor
would include use of the medical database made by that assumes a dual role; it reflects the innate natural
insurance companies when making decisions about properties of privacy and autonomy, and, based on these
issuing life insurance policies. According to Neill, an original, innate properties, it provides the moral justifica-
insurance company does not transgress an individual’s tion for constructing societal norms protective of privacy.
privacy when it acquires that person’s health information Though Neill does not couch her analysis of privacy in
for decision-making purposes. In such cases, according to terms of access to information or personal data protec-
Neill, the individual is seeking to protect an economic tion, her model anticipates the tension between these
interest in obtaining a life insurance policy without fully policy goals. Neill’s model demonstrates that medical
disclosing all the relevant information necessary for the information, with the exception of mental health coun-
insurance underwriter to reach a decision. 14 It is only if selling notes, should be protected by conventional fluc-
information held within medical databases is released to tuating norms, rather than the static norms that protect
a third party without the consent of the person that her the fundamental privacy of the ‘‘sacred self’’. Put another
innate privacy would be violated. Indeed, Neill claims way, because medical information lacks a clear relation-
that medical information is about the body rather than ship to symbolic or psychological properties and rights,
of the body and therefore merits protection not through it, according to Neill’s model, does not warrant protec-
static norms but rather through fluctuating norms; tion through an appeal to a strict privacy right. Instead,
norms that are determined by governments who are this type of personal information merits protection
under pressure in our information age to demonstrate through fluctuating norms that are subject to tradeoffs
that rights are being taken seriously and safeguarded. To with other fluctuating rights.
put it another way, Neill’s ontology of natural rights Although not explicit, Neill’s distinction betweenviews the body as a symbol of human dignity and thus the privacy of the ‘‘sacred self’’ and the broader privacydeserving of protection by static norms that express the rights associated with the ‘‘rights trade’’ that can bedignity of the inner self through reference to the observ- exchanged for other goods, appears roughly analogous toable self. Information about the health of that body; the differences between privacy and personal data pro-however, does not reside within the refuge of what is tection. 16 A ‘‘true’’ privacy interest that protects theconsidered innately private. ‘‘sacred self’’ warrants strict protection, while other
The view of a national medical data bank as not claims not linked to the ‘‘sacred self’’ are subject to trade-
approaching inherent privacy is grounded in the recogni- offs with competing interests. Thus, Neill’s model offers
tion that the body is neither itself factually innately dig- a compelling theoretical justification of privacy that not
nified nor, a related point, that from which our meta- only establishes a convincing link between narrow pri-
phor of human dignity arises. This, I think, has been a vacy interests and human dignity, but also helps explain
point of massive confusion in Western culture where the instances in which interests related to broader privacy
body, which (as an aspect of dignity) is merely a concrete claims and rights might be subject to opposing public
symbol of what we revere, has, through its concreteness policy claims, which seems to closely reflect the purposes
and as the object around which static norms are con- of personal data protection legislation. Based upon this
structed, come wrongly to be viewed as the seat of distinction it is proposed that we construct a pri-
inherent dignity itself. Yet it is only in its concreteness vacy–data protection continuum, which can be utilized
that the body represents our dignity and the innate to situate claims to privacy protection. ‘‘True’’ privacy
properties of human thinking, and so facts about our claims, or those reflective of an individual’s inherent pri-
bodies are not inherently private, even where economic vacy and dignity, occupy one end of the spectrum, while
and other social interests might cause us to wish that those broader claims to privacy, which, extrapolating
they were. 15 from Neill’s model, might more appropriately be termed
The one area of medical information where Neill ‘‘data protection’’, find a base at the opposing end (see
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Figure 1 — Privacy–Personal Data Protection Con- 1. Collection Limitation Principle: There should be
tinuum Based on Elizabeth Neill limits to the collection of personal data and any
such data should be obtained by lawful and fair
means and, where appropriate, with the knowl-
edge or consent of the data subject. 20
2. Data Quality Principle: Personal data should be
relevant to the purposes for which they are to be
used, and, to the extent necessary for those pur-With reference to Neill’s ontology of privacy rights,
poses, should be accurate, complete and kept up-various international and national legislative devices in
to-date.respect of personal (health) information can be evaluated
in terms of the degree to which they address privacy 3. Purpose Specification Principle: The purposes for
claims or data protection imperatives and, thus, where which personal data are collected should be spec-
they might be situated on the continuum. It is exactly ified not later than at the time of data collection
upon such an analysis that attention will now focus. and the subsequent use limited to the fulfilment
of those purposes or such others as are not
incompatible with those purposes and as are
specified on each occasion of change of purpose.International Privacy Guidelines
4. Use Limitation Principle: Personal data shouldand Legislation: Privacy or Data
not be disclosed, made available or otherwiseProtection? 
used for purposes other than those specified in
s a number of researchers argue, the privacy legisla- accordance with paragraph 3 [purpose specifica-A tion of the 1970s and 1980s was generally designed tion principle] except
to address concerns about the privacy relationship (a) with the consent of the data subject; or
between the individual and the state. 17 Yet, in the
(b) by the authority of law.interim, transformations in the economic, political, and
technological landscape have occasioned the locus of 5. Security Safeguards Principle: Personal data
concern regarding privacy protection to shift toward a should be protected by reasonable security safe-
sharpened emphasis on the commercial exploitation of guards against such risks as loss or unauthorised
privacy. 18 Health information, as a sector, has also been access, destruction, use, modification or disclo-
caught up in such changes and has not escaped domestic sure of data.
and international pressures for minimum standards of 6. Openness Principle: There should be a generalprotection for personal information, as well as harmoni- policy of openness about developments, practiceszation between jurisdictions. To better understand some and policies with respect to personal data. Meansimportant responses to this situation, the following should be readily available of establishing theexamination of international guidelines and legislation is existence and nature of personal data, and theoffered. main purposes of their use, as well as the identity
and usual residence of the data controller.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation
7. Individual Participation Principle: An individualand Development should have the right:
By the late 1970s, the Organisation for Economic
(a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise,Co-operation and Development (‘‘OECD’’) recognized
confirmation of whether or not the data con-the potential for conflict between automatic data
troller has data relating to him;processing capabilities and privacy protection. Indeed,
(b) to have communicated to him, data relatingthis concern was being reflected by the introduction of
to himprivacy laws in a number of countries ‘‘to prevent what
are considered to be violations of fundamental human (i) within a reasonable time;
rights, such as the unlawful storage of personal data, the
(ii) at a charge, if any, that is not excessive;storage of inaccurate personal data, or the abuse or
(iii) in a reasonable manner;unauthorised disclosure of such data’’. 19 Concerned
about the effect that disparate national treatment of per- (iv) in a form that is readily intelligible to
sonal data could have on commerce, the OECD adopted him;
and published in 1980, Guidelines on the Protection of
(v) to be given reasons if a request made . . .Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data
is denied, and to be able to challenge(‘‘OECD Guidelines’’) in an attempt to spur harmoniza-
such denial; andtion of national legislation. The OECD Guidelines set
out the following eight basic principles that establish (vi) to challenge data relating to him and, if
































































92 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
data erased, rectified, completed or pean Union Directive that protects personal data, to
amended. which attention will now turn.
8. Accountability Principle: A data controller
should be accountable for complying with mea- The European Union sures which give effect to the principles stated
The Council of Ministers of the European Unionabove. 21 These Guidelines, which Canada
(EU) formally adopted the Directive on the Protection ofadopted in 1984, were designed to strike a bal-
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personalance between respect for privacy as a human
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (‘‘EU Dataright and the facilitation of international data
Protection Directive’’) on October 24, 1995. 22 A Direc-flows. The importance attributed to the free flow
tive from the Council of Ministers is a type of frameworkof information in support of commercial pur-
legislation that, while binding on Member States, doesposes is reflected in one of the recommendations
provide each with the right to determine the means ofmade by the OECD, contained in its Guidelines,
implementation and the actual wording of the nationalwhich states that member countries should
legislation necessary to implement the Directive. For thisrefrain from erecting barriers to data flows in the
reason all members of the EU were granted three yearsname of privacy protection. The OECD Guide-
for implementation. It took five years to develop thelines themselves, which are neutral with regard
Directive, during which time a number of changes wereto type of technology, apply only to identifiable
made, including: the deletion of a distinction betweeninformation, whether in the public or private
the public and private sector, thus mirroring the OECDsector and are to be interpreted as minimum
Guidelines; the permissibility of a ‘‘negative option’’ withstandards that national governments can supple-
regard to informed consent; an exemption for the press;ment to legitimately protect personal privacy and
the application of the rules to manually processed data;individual liberties. Since the OECD Guidelines
the processing of sensitive data; and, the role and inde-attempt to establish a minimal threshold of pri-
pendence of national supervisory bodies. 23 The inclusionvacy protection that can be applied broadly by
of the phrase ‘‘Free Movement of Such Data’’ in the titleindividual nations, it is not surprising that they
of the EU Data Protection Directive, which also accordsdo not treat health information specifically. The
with one of the stated purposes of the OECD Guidelines,OECD Guidelines also recognize that different
is telling of the influence of private sector lobbyists on itstypes of data have different degrees of sensitivity
development and content. 24and thus may not all require protection; how-
ever, any exceptions, including those made on The EU Data Protection Directive, similar to most
the basis of national sovereignty, national directives promulgated by the Council of Ministers,
security and public policy, should be as few as requires the reader to first wade through 72 ‘‘whereas
possible and made known to the public. Consid- statements’’, drafted to help interpretation and state
ering Neill’s model and the privacy–data protec- intentions, before actually getting to the articles it sets
tion continuum, the OECD Guidelines appear out. Broadly stated, the 34 articles contained in the EU
more concerned with the protection of personal Data Protection Directive reflect the ‘‘fair information
data than with privacy and should therefore be practices’’ also found in the OECD Guidelines. The
situated toward the middle right of the spec- Directive’s purpose, as outlined in article 1, is to protect
trum, closer to the ontological level of the ‘‘rights the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons,
trade’’ that protects the broader, fluctuating especially privacy with respect to the processing of per-
rights to a private life (see Figure 2). sonal data, without obstructing the free flow of informa-
Figure 2 — Location of the OECD Guidelines on Pri- tion between Member States. Article 2, which sets out
vacy–Personal Data Protection Continuum definitions, states, ‘‘‘personal data’ shall mean any infor-
mation relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identification number or to one or more
factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, eco-
nomic, cultural or social identity’’. 25 Additionally, it is
interesting to note that the EU Data Protection Directive
defines ‘‘processing of personal data’’ in a manner that
combines collection, use, and disclosure of information.
Some commentators have argued that this is perhaps a
While not a universal or binding standard, the eight more realistic conception of information manipulation
principles articulated by the OECD Guidelines are that reflects the fluidity and decentralization of the con-
reflected in one form or another in most Western pri- temporary environment. 26 Article 3, which discusses
































































Personal Medical Information: Privacy or Personal Data Protection? 93
public security, defence, State security (including the eco- the data controller or representative, the purposes for
nomic well-being of a State when the processing opera- which the data will be processed, the identity of recipi-
tion relates to State security matters) and the activities of ents or categories of recipients of the data, and any rights
the State in areas of criminal law’’ as well as the regarding access to and correction of data. 35 Moreover,
processing of personal information ‘‘in the course of a the data controller must ‘‘notify the supervisory
purely personal or household activity’’ fall outside the authority referred to in article 28 [public authorities sim-
purview of the EU Data Protection Directive. 27 ilar to Canada’s Privacy Commissioner] before carrying
out any wholly or partly automatic processing operationThe OECD ‘‘collection limitation principle ’’,
or set of such operations’’. 36 Article 21 further stipulatesarguably the most important element of ‘‘fair informa-
that the supervisory authority must maintain a register oftion practices’’, is incorporated in the EU Data Protection
all processing operations for which it receives a notifica-Directive through article 6. It requires that personal data
tion and that this register shall be made available to themay only be ‘‘collected for specified, explicit and legiti-
public.mate purposes and not further processed in a way
incompatible with those purposes’’. 28 There is, however, The ‘‘individual participation principle’’ found in
an exception made for data processing if done for histor- the OECD Guidelines is also reflected in the EU Data
ical, statistical or scientific purposes. Data controllers Protection Directive, through article 12, which outlines a
must also ensure that the data are accurate, that the right of access for data subjects. Data controllers must
amount of information collected is not excessive in rela- confirm ‘‘without excessive delay or expense’’ whether or
tion to the stated purpose for collection and processing, not they possess information about an individual, and if
and that the data are not kept in identifiable form for so, the purposes for which the data are being processed
any longer than is necessary to fulfil the original purpose and to whom they will be disclosed. The data controller
for their collection. 29 must also inform the person as to the source of the
Article 7 of the EU Data Protection Directive out- information37 and an individual has the right to correct,
lines the six criteria for judging whether a data delete or demand a halt to the processing of any personal
processing operation satisfies the requirement of clause information that is incomplete, incorrect or otherwise in
1(a) of article 6 that personal data must be ‘‘processed contravention of one of the provisions of the Directive. 38
fairly and lawfully’’. The six legal grounds are: the data Any rectification, erasure or stop to processing must also
subject has given unambiguous consent; processing is be communicated to third parties who have received the
necessary to perform a contract to which the individual information. 39
is a party; processing is necessary to comply with a legal
The EU Data Protection Directive differs from theobligation; processing is necessary to protect the vital
OECD Guidelines in that it generally prohibits theinterests of the data subject; the processing is necessary
processing of data concerning health or sex life or anyfor the performance of a task carried out in the public
other personal data that would reveal racial or ethnicinterest; or processing is required to satisfy the legitimate
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophicalinterests of the data controller or third party. 30 The last
beliefs, or trade union membership. 40 The Directivetwo grounds for processing personal information may be
does, however, provide the following exceptions to thisoverridden by the data subject on ‘‘compelling legitimate
prohibition: if the data subject provides consent; if thegrounds relating to his particular situation’’. 31 Data sub-
information is required by a Member State’s nationaljects may also object to the use of their data for direct
employment law, provided adequate safeguards are inmarketing purposes, although the Directive leaves the
place; if the processing is necessary to protect the vitalmechanism, either opt-in or opt-out measures, to the
interests of the data subject; if the processing is done by adiscretion of Member States. 32
non-profit entity, with a political, philosophical, religious
The EU Data Protection Directive also includes or trade union mandate only with regard to its own
demands related to the OECD ‘‘security safeguards prin- members, and there is no third party disclosure without
ciple’’. Data controllers must ‘‘implement appropriate consent; if the data are already in the public realm or are
technical and organizational measures to protect per- required for legal proceedings; if the data are required to
sonal data against accidental or unlawful destruction or facilitate medical care and are processed by a health care
accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or professional subject to either legal or professional obliga-
access’’ and all measures undertaken must be appro- tions of secrecy; and, if the processing is required for
priate to the level of risk. 33 These requirements apply to police activities and done only by official authorities. 41
data controllers who process their own data as well as to This article also provides a clause that permits Member
third party organizations contracted by a data controller States to allow additional exceptions if they are in the
to process data on its behalf. 34 national public interest. 42 The EU Data Protection Direc-
The EU Data Protection Directive reflects the tive thus carves out, subject to limited exemptions,
‘‘openness principle’’ of the OECD Guidelines and ‘‘fair health information, treating this type of information ana-
information practices’’ in its requirement that data sub- lytically exceptionally vis-à-vis the rest of the Directive.
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value and thus need for protection that attaches to per- health information by the Directive indicates that its
sonal health information, while at the same time protection is considered to be more about privacy than
including an exception for medical practitioners so as personal data protection. This somewhat anomalous
not to impede the provision of medical services. Simi- nature of the EU Data Protection Directive vis-à-vis other
larly, this qualified prohibition on the use of data legislative schemes to protect privacy, which warrants
regarding an individual’s health or sex life might also dual placement on the privacy–personal data protection
have been included in the EU Data Protection Directive continuum, is outlined in Figure 3.
to ensure compliance with the Convention for the Pro- Figure 3 — Dual Location of EU Data Protection
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Directive on Privacy–Personal Data Protection Con-
(‘‘ECHR’’) 43 adopted by the Council of Europe in 1950, tinuum
which stipulates in article 8 the ‘‘right to respect for
private and family life’’. 44 45
Article 9 of the EU Data Protection Directive pro-
vides exemptions for the processing of personal data car-
ried out for journalistic, artistic, or literary purposes.
Article 13 outlines the exemptions related to national
security, defence, public security, police investigation
activities, economic interests of a Member State or the
European Union, and the protection of the data subject
or of the rights and freedoms of others.
Finally, as briefly alluded to above in the discussion The OECD Guidelines and the EU Data Protection
of the ‘‘openness principle’’, the EU Data Protection Directive thus contain a number of similarities that, in
Directive specifies that each Member State must have an general, make them more about personal data protection
independent public authority responsible for monitoring than privacy. The exception is EU health information,
the provisions adopted pursuant to the Directive. Each which, given its special status under the EU Data Protec-
national authority must be endowed with investigative tion Directive, is allied more closely with privacy issues
powers, the power to engage in legal proceedings or than with personal data protection. If this is the situation
bring any violations to the attention of the applicable at the international level, what is happening in Canada?
judicial authorities, and powers of intervention. This
latter power should include the ability to issue opinions
and orders that block or ban processing, the right to
Canadian Federal and Provincialadmonish data controllers, and the right to refer matters
to national parliaments. 46 The public authority is also Legislation 
responsible for receiving and investigating claims from
aving outlined Neill’s model of privacy protectionany person relating to the lawfulness of data processing H and established where two prominent interna-about that person.
tional devices putatively designed to regulate privacy are
The EU Data Protection Directive appeals to the situated within that model, this section will engage the
necessity of protecting fundamental rights and freedoms, second question driving this paper by comparing the
or what Neill would presumably consider innate privacy Personal Information Protection and Electronic Docu-
and autonomy, especially with regard to the qualified ments Act and the provincial Acts in Alberta, Saskatch-
prohibition on the processing of information about a ewan, Manitoba, and Ontario that deal specifically with
person’s health or sex life. In general, however, the EU health information. In addition to presenting a compara-
Data Protection Directive endeavours to protect rights tive analysis, these pieces of legislation will be assessed to
and freedoms without obstructing data flows; a fact establish where they fit on the privacy–personal data
attested to by the full title of the Directive. For this latter continuum, in order to discern whether health informa-
reason, the Directive contains a number of exemptions tion protection in Canada is more about privacy than
from its scope that are based upon public policy priori- personal data protection.
ties other than privacy protection. The Directive, there-
fore, cannot be considered to defend what Neill would
Personal Information Protection andconsider ‘‘legitimate’’ privacy interests based upon pro-
Electronic Documents Act tection of the ‘‘sacred self’’. The rights enunciated by the
EU Data Protection Directive, except with regard to Although in Canada personal information main-
health and sex life information, align more closely with tained by the federal government was first safeguarded
broader claims to privacy whose ontological status by Part IV of the Canadian Human Rights Act47 of 1977,
would place them closer to the data protection than the and subsequently through the Privacy Act48 of 1982,
privacy side of the spectrum, similar to that of the OECD which came into force on July 1, 1983, it was not until
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and Electronic Documents Act (‘‘PIPEDA’’) received 2004: the Act now covers all information collected, used
Royal Assent, that protection began to be extended to or disclosed during the course of commercial activities
information held by the private sector in Canada. 49 In by private sector organizations, not governed under
the meantime, protection of personal information equivalent provincial legislation. It is the ‘‘commercial
throughout much of the rest of the public sector in clause’’ 55 that the federal government has used to consti-
Canada had gradually been enacted. 50 Part of the moti- tutionally justify the reach of the PIPEDA into what
vation behind enacting the PIPEDA for private sector otherwise might be considered provincial jurisdiction.
privacy protection was perceived international pressure The application of this notion of ‘‘commercial activity’’
from the European Union, the member states of which, to the health sector has caused much unresolved confu-
in adherence to its Data Protection Directive, would sion since health has traditionally been an area of provin-
limit transnational data flows to only those foreign coun- cial legislative activity. 56
tries with similar legislative mechanisms in place. As the
As defined by the PIPEDA, ‘‘‘commercial activity’legislative history of the PIPEDA points out, ‘‘Part I of Bill
means any particular transaction, act or conduct or anyC-6 (PIPEDA) also responds to recent privacy initiatives
regular course of conduct that is of a commercial char-in Europe . . . The Directive [EU Data Protection Direc-
acter, including the selling, bartering or leasing of donor,tive] could, therefore, have a negative impact on Cana-
membership or other fundraising lists’’. 57 Aside fromdian businesses engaged in commerce with companies
being circular, such a definition does not go very far inin European Union countries, unless adequate privacy
helping to clarify the scope of the Act. As the Canadianlegislation is introduced in Canada’’. 51 Indeed, article 25
Institutes of Health Research has pointed out:of the EU Data Protection Directive provides:
There are some important activities in the health sector, the1. The Member States shall provide that the transfer
nature of which cannot yet be clearly determined one wayto a third country of personal data which are or another. For example, whether the services of a health
undergoing processing or are intended for professional carried out in a private clinic reimbursed by the
public purse will be considered ‘‘commercial activity’’processing after transfer may take place only if,
within the meaning of the PIPED Act is not yet known.without prejudice to compliance with the
Whether the activities of private, not-for-profit organizationsnational provisions adopted pursuant to the
and/or cost-recovery activities constitute ‘‘commercialother provisions of this Directive, the third activity’’ is likewise impossible to ascertain at this stage and
country in question ensures an adequate level of will likely be circumscribed over time through judicial inter-
pretation. 58protection.
2. The adequacy of the level of protection afforded There is an element of the PIPEDA itself, however,
by a third country shall be assessed in the light of that might render these constitutional concerns largely
all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer redundant; namely the ‘‘substantially similar’’ clause,
operation or set of data transfer operations; par- which exempts provinces from having to adhere to the
ticular consideration shall be given to the nature Act if they pass legislation that the federal government
of the data, the purpose and duration of the pro- recognizes as ‘‘substantially similar’’ to the PIPEDA.59 If
posed processing operation or operations, the the four provincial health information protection Acts
country of origin and country of final destina- examined in this paper are so recognized by the federal
tion, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, government, then not only would the PIPEDA no longer
in force in the third country in question and the apply to health information within those provinces, but
professional rules and security measures which such information would receive constitutionally unam-
are complied with in that country. . . . . 52 biguous protection through provincial acts.
In a decision from December 20, 2001 the EU The federal Department of Industry, whose Minister
Commission stated that Canada’s PIPEDA did meet the is responsible for making recommendations about
required standard under its Data Protection Directive. 53 exemptions to the Governor in Council, outlined in the
Thus, the PIPEDA achieved the objective of ensuring Canada Gazette60 the process that will be employed to
that EU Member State companies could continue to do determine whether provincial legislation may qualify for
business with Canadian firms. an exemption based on the ‘‘substantially similar’’ clause
The full scope of the PIPEDA was implemented in a in the PIPEDA.61 With reference to the presentation by
staggered fashion. As of January 1, 2001, it applied to all then Industry Minister John Manley to the Standing
federally regulated private sector organizations as well as Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Tech-
those that disclosed personal information for considera- nology, substantially similar statutes will generally
tion across provincial or national boundaries. A Senate require ‘‘legislation that provides a basic set of fair infor-
amendment motivated by concern over the applicability mation practices which are consistent with the CSA
of the Act to personal health information resulted in an Standard, oversight by an independent body and redress
exemption from coverage for health information until for those who are aggrieved’’. 62 As of writing, only
January 1, 2002. 54 In the third phase, all provisions out- Ontario’s Personal Health Information Protection Act,
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tially similar’’. 64 The health information protection legis- 8. Openness: An organization shall make readily
lation in Alberta, 65 Manitoba, and Saskatchewan has not. available to individuals specific information
It should be pointed out that even if the provincial Acts about its policies and practices relating to the
are deemed equivalent to the PIPEDA, it is the federal management of personal information.
government’s position that the federal Act would still
9. Individual Access: Upon request, an individualapply to a health care provider or hospital when
shall be informed of the existence, use, and dis-engaging in inter-provincial and international commer-
closure of his or her personal information andcial dealings. 66 This might, in turn, still raise the constitu-
shall be given access to that information. An indi-tional battle between provincial regulation of health and
vidual shall be able to challenge the accuracy andfederal regulation of inter-provincial trade and com-
completeness of the information and have itmerce.
amended as appropriate.
The PIPEDA is an interesting piece of legislation in
10. Challenging Compliance: An individual shall bethat it sets out the bulk of its requirements related to fair
able to address a challenge concerning compli-information practices in a Schedule rather than directly
ance with the above principles to the designatedin the Act. Moreover, Schedule 1, which sets out the
individual or individuals accountable for themain information handling provisions with which all
organization’s compliance. 68organizations subject to the Act must comply, is, ver-
batim, the Model Code for the Protection of Personal As is readily apparent, this Schedule very closelyInformation (‘‘CSA Code’’) 67 developed by the Canadian resembles the OECD Guidelines discussed above, whichStandards Association in 1996. Thus the PIPEDA is not is not surprising given that Canada adopted them inworded as legislation usually is, but rather, is formulated 1984, and both the Schedule and the Guidelines areusing what was originally a voluntary guide to conduct. motivated by the desire to strike a balance between pri-Schedule 1 of the Act sets out the following 10 informa- vacy and the free flow of information for commercialtion principles: purposes. The only major difference between the two
1. Accountability: An organization is responsible for schemas is that Schedule 1 includes a right for individ-
personal information under its control and shall uals to challenge concerns about compliance with these
designate an individual or individuals who are ‘‘fair information practices’’, something that is not con-
accountable for the organization’s compliance tained in the OECD Guidelines. The PIPEDA, unlike the
with the following principles. EU Data Protection Directive, does not offer a separate
regime of protection for ‘‘sensitive data’’; the PIPEDA2. Identifying Purposes: The purposes for which
does not provide rules pertaining to the recipients ofpersonal information is collected shall be identi-
personal information; and, the PIPEDA applies only tofied by the organization at or before the time the
organizations engaged in commercial activities; whereas,information is collected.
the EU Data Protection Directive and the OECD Guide-
3. Consent: The knowledge and consent of the lines apply to all controllers of personal information.
individual are required for the collection, use, or
Like the EU Data Protection Directive, the PIPEDAdisclosure of personal information, except where
provides exemptions from coverage, with respect to per-inappropriate.
sonal and domestic use of personal data, as well as use
4. Limiting Collection: The collection of personal for journalistic, artistic, or literary purposes. Where these
information shall be limited to that which is nec- exemptions do not apply, the PIPEDA generally requires
essary for the purposes identified by the organiza- the knowledge and consent of the individual who is the
tion. Information shall be collected by fair and subject of the data (data subject) before any personal
lawful means. information may be collected, used, and/or disclosed.
There are, however, some important exceptions. Collec-5. Limiting Use, Disclosure, and Retention: Per-
tion may occur without consent, if consent cannot besonal information shall not be used or disclosed
obtained in a timely manner, if it would compromisefor purposes other than those for which it was
the availability or accuracy of the information, or if thecollected, except with the consent of the indi-
collection is necessary to investigate a crime.69 Personalvidual or as required by law. Personal informa-
information can be used without consent for policetion shall be retained only as long as necessary
investigations, in a case of an emergency that threatensfor the fulfilment of those purposes.
the life, health, or security of an individual, and for statis-
6. Accuracy: Personal information shall be as accu- tical or scholarly study or research as long as confidenti-
rate, complete, and up-to-date as is necessary for ality is ensured. 70 Disclosures of personal information
the purposes for which it is to be used. may be made by an organization without the knowledge
7. Safeguards: Personal information shall be pro- or consent of the data subject for debt collection, law
tected by security safeguards appropriate to the enforcement, national security, emergency situations, sta-
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subpoena or warrant, and at the earlier of 100 years after December 8, 1999 and came into force on April 25,
the record was created or 20 years after the death of the 2001. 75 Saskatchewan passed the Health Information
individual to whom the information pertains. 72 More- Protection Act (‘‘HIPA’’) on May 6, 1999, which was pro-
over, if these exemptions apply, an organization may claimed in force on September 1, 2003. 76 Manitoba’s
disclose personal information for purposes other than Personal Health Information Act (‘‘PHIA’’) was passed on
those for which it was collected. June 28, 1997 and came into force on December 11,
1997. 77 Ontario’s Personal Health Information Protec-The PIPEDA also sets out the procedures for
tion Act (PHIPA) came into force on November 1,making requests for access to the information an organi-
200478 and, as mentioned previously, it is the only pro-zation holds about an individual, including time limits
vincial health information protection act that, as offor response, notification and response requirements for
writing, has been recognized by the federal governmentorganizations, and prohibitions on access to certain types
as being ‘‘substantially similar’’ to the PIPEDA.79 Each ofof information. Denying access is permissible if doing so
the four Acts outlines similar purposes, including thewould reveal personal information about a third party
following: to protect the privacy of individuals with(unless that person consents to disclosure or the informa-
regard to their health information; to enable access totion can be severed), if the information is protected by
and the sharing of health information in order to pro-solicitor–client privilege, if disclosure would reveal confi-
vide health services and manage the health system; todential commercial information, if release of the infor-
prescribe rules for the collection, use, and disclosure ofmation could threaten the life or security of another
personal health information; to provide individuals withperson, or if the information was generated in the course
rights of access to and correction of their medicalof a formal dispute resolution process. 73
records; to establish remedies for contravention of theIndividuals may file complaints with the federal Pri- Acts; and, to provide for independent reviews of deci-vacy Commissioner against organizations that have con- sions made under the Act. 80 All four provincial Actstravened any of the provisions related to the collection, apply to identifiable personal health information, 81use, and disclosure of personal information. When inves- which includes information about both mental andtigating complaints the Commissioner is provided with physical health. 82 While Saskatchewan, Manitoba, andpowers to summon witnesses, administer oaths, receive Ontario limit the scope of their respective Acts toevidence, and enter premises to examine records and encompass only personally identifiable information,talk with any person located therein. However, unlike Alberta legislation sets out explicit provisions that permitthe national authorities in the EU, the federal Privacy the collection, use, and disclosure of non-identifyingCommissioner lacks any order-making power and must health information, with very few restrictions. 83 All of therely on mediation, conciliation, and recommendations. 74 Acts further specify their scope by outlining who quali-
The above explication and analysis of the PIPEDA fies as a ‘‘custodian’’ (Alberta), 84 ‘‘trustee’’ (Saskatchewan
has helped develop a basis of comparison to the four and Manitoba), 85 or ‘‘health information custodian’’
provincial Acts in respect of health information in order (Ontario). 86 These are the people and organizations
to respond to the second research question of this paper; required to abide by the provisions of the Acts with
namely, do the various provincial health information regard to the collection, use, disclosure, retention, and
protection Acts go beyond the PIPEDA, such that health disposition of personal health information. They include
information protection might better be considered, physicians, hospitals, pharmacists, district health boards,
more about privacy than personal data protection? This medical laboratories, special-care homes, mental health
comparative examination will also lay the groundwork care facilities, and ambulance services, among others.
for developing a response to the query about which of Trustees and custodians are also responsible for ensuring
the Acts is aligned with Neill’s model. the security, confidentiality, accuracy, and integrity of
personal health information in their custody. 87
Provincial Legislation All of the four Acts contain detailed sections per-
The PIPEDA does not hamper the provinces from taining to the collection of personal health information.
enacting legislation within their respective jurisdictions. In most cases, the collection of non-identifying informa-
It purports to provide a baseline for the protection of tion is permissible. Identifiable information may only be
personal information in Canada. In fact, the ‘‘substan- collected if it is directly related and necessary to carry out
tially similar’’ clause invites provinces to develop their a purpose specified by the Act, which is usually the provi-
own legislation applicable to their distinctive needs and sion of health services. The Acts provide that information
requirements. As mentioned, to date, four provinces have should always be collected directly from the individual
promulgated information protection legislation specific to whom it pertains, unless otherwise authorized by the
to the health care industry. individual, impossible in the circumstances, or would
All of the provincial Acts, as opposed to the PIPEDA, result in the collection of inaccurate information. In
apply to health care providers, regardless of whether they Alberta and Manitoba, a custodian is only required to
are engaged in commercial activities. Alberta’s Health take reasonable steps to inform the individual of the
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about consent, 88 while in Saskatchewan and Ontario poses, as will be discussed subsequently, all of the Acts
consent must be informed, although it may be express or permit disclosure without consent for evaluation pur-
implied and need not be in writing. 89 Although, at face poses by quality of care committees, for court proceed-
value, Alberta and Manitoba would appear to offer less ings, for police investigations, for investigations by pro-
protection, presumably most individuals would consent vincial Ministries of Health for fraud detection purposes,
to the collection of personal health information by their and to health professional regulatory bodies if required
health care provider in order to facilitate the diagnosis for investigations. With regard to disclosure, the Ontario
and treatment of services being offered. The more troub- Information and Privacy Commissioner has commented
ling areas of provincial legislation where personal health on the role of so-called ‘‘lock boxes’’ in health privacy
information is susceptible to abuse relate to use and legislation, which offer patients the statutory right to
disclosure provisions, to which attention will now turn. prohibit health care providers from disclosing their
health information to any other providers.As mentioned previously, the Acts in Saskatchewan,
Manitoba, and Ontario apply only to personally identifi- This so-called ‘‘lock box’’, which would provide individuals
with some control over disclosures of their personal healthable information, 90 while the Act in Alberta also includes
information, is a key component of privacy protection. Inprovisions that permit the collection, use, and disclosure
the absence of any ability to control what information isof non-identifying health information for any purpose. 91 shared among health care providers, in some cases
In general, under these Acts, personally identifiable extremely sensitive, subjective, personally damaging, irrele-
vant, or outdated personal health information could behealth information may only be used to provide health
shared against the wishes of the individual. 96services: for purposes consistent with those that gave rise
to the original collection, to determine the eligibility of a Some observers argue that health care providers
patient to receive a health service, to monitor and pre- have opposed such restrictions on disclosure for fear that
vent or reveal cases of fraudulent use of publicly funded it would require the creation of multiple records, com-
health services, to conduct research (subject to ethics promise patient care, and increase the potential liability
committee review), to conduct investigations relating to of health care providers. 97 Only Manitoba’s PHIA98 and
members of a health profession, to provide health ser- Ontario’s PHIPA99 provide this ‘‘lock box’’ type of protec-
vices provider education, to obtain payment for services, tion for individuals, although Saskatchewan’s HIPA only
to conduct internal management activities, to comply permits disclosure of medical information to other
with subpoenas, warrants, or orders issued by a court, health care providers without consent ‘‘where it is not
and for use by a prescribed professional body to dis- reasonably practicable to obtain consent’’ 100 and only if
charge its duties. 92 Additionally, in Alberta, provincial the person receiving the information agrees to use it
health boards, regional health authorities and the Min- ‘‘only for the purpose for which it is being disclosed’’ and
ister and Ministry of Health may use identifiable health does not ‘‘make a further disclosure of the informa-
information for planning and resource allocation, health tion.’’ 101 In addition, all of the provincial Acts permit
system management, public health surveillance, and disclosure without consent, in order to facilitate the per-
health policy development. 93 Similar provisions are also mitted uses discussed above.
found in Saskatchewan’s, Manitoba’s, and Ontario’s legis-
All four of the provincial Acts also contain provi-lation. 94 The relatively broad range of institutions in all
sions that require ethics approval for research using per-four provinces that can use personal health information
sonally identifiable health information. Section 50 ofwithout the consent of the information subject, has occa-
Alberta’s HIA empowers the ethics review board tosioned at least one observer to claim that the provincial
determine whether consent is required from the indi-statutes ‘‘have been variously described as having very
vidual to whom the information pertains. Similarly, Sas-little to do with privacy and [being] much more con-
katchewan’s HIPA allows for use of personal health infor-cerned with providing government and researcher[s]
mation without consent if ‘‘ in the opinion of theaccess to confidential medical records’’. 95 While there is
research ethics committee, the potential benefits of thecertainly some truth to this accusation, these exemptions
research project clearly outweigh the potential risk to theare not surprising when one considers that all the stat-
privacy of the subject individual’’. 102 Manitoba’s PHIAutes were enacted by provinces; provinces that are
and Ontario’s PHIPA contain very similar provisions. 103responsible for administering and substantially funding
The research exemptions in the provincial Acts arethe health care systems within their jurisdictions.
roughly analogous to the scholarly research exemptionWithout reliable information about these systems, man-
contained in paragraph 7(2)(c) of the PIPEDA.agement in times of tight fiscal conditions and rising
expectations, is made quite difficult, if not impossible. Each provincial Act also confers on individuals a
The four provincial Acts contain disclosure provi- general right of access to their medical records under the
sions that generally prohibit health care providers from control of a custodian or trustee. Each Act outlines the
disclosing identifying health information without con- necessary procedures for making an access request and
sent, unless permitted or required by another section of includes: a duty to assist individuals with their applica-
the respective Act. In addition to the release of informa- tions if required; rules about time frames to respond to

































































Personal Medical Information: Privacy or Personal Data Protection? 99
information in a record as well as rights of refusal by the providers within their respective jurisdictions. The
custodian to make a correction; and exemptions for PIPEDA is a much broader legislative instrument
when access may be denied. 104 designed to establish a minimal threshold of data protec-
tion within all sectors of the private market. Moreover,The powers granted to Information and Privacy
while principle 4 (‘‘limiting collection’’) of Schedule 1 ofCommissioners, or Ombudsman in Manitoba, differ
the PIPEDA allows an organization to specify the pur-among the four provinces, with Alberta and Ontario
poses for which it collects information, the provincialconferring the strongest powers on their Commissioners.
Acts actually enumerate, and thus limit, the purposes forSections 80 through 82 of the HIA grant the Alberta
which information may be collected. The provincial ActsCommissioner the ability to make binding orders
further stipulate that information, subject to limitedregarding access to records by patients, administrative
exceptions, should always be collected directly from thematters pertaining to time limits and fees, and the collec-
individual to whom it relates. The PIPEDA is silent ontion, use, correction, disclosure, and destruction of health
this point, which, given its commercial nature, is not thatrecords. Sections 52 and 53 of Saskatchewan’s HIPA
surprising.equip the Commissioner with the ability only to com-
ment and make recommendations. Although individuals
do have the right under section 50 of the HIPA to appeal Despite these differences, the preceding review has
to a court a decision by a health care provider refusing also made it clear that a number of the obligations
access to a record, this section does not address any other imposed by provincial statute, mirror similar require-
issues surrounding health information such as use, cor- ments found in the PIPEDA. Support for this position
rection, disclosure, and final disposition. In Manitoba, may be found in the fact that it has been argued, at least
Part 4 of the PHIA permits the Ombudsman, as in Sas- in Ontario, that ‘‘[m]ost physicians who have developed
katchewan, to investigate complaints from individuals privacy policies to comply with PIPEDA will only have
about the treatment of their personal information and to to make minor adjustments to them as a result of
make recommendations. If warranted, the Manitoba PHIPA.’’ 106 Each piece of legislation attempts to vest in
Ombudsman may also forward complaints to the pro- the individual some degree of control over personal
vincial Attorney General or professional regulatory health information by implementing consent require-
bodies. In Ontario, section 61 of the PHIPA confers upon ments before others may collect, use or disclose person-
the Information and Privacy Commissioner the right to ally identifiable information. Such consent requirements
make binding orders about access, collection, use, and notwithstanding, beyond protecting the privacy of an
disclosure of personal health information, as well as individual’s medical information, each of the statutes
orders concerning specific information practices of outlines an additional purpose: fostering information
health information custodians. These powers were not exchange within an increasingly diverse health care
contained in the original draft of the PHIPA, but were system. Indeed, each provincial law, like the PIPEDA,
requested by the Commissioner in her detailed submis- contains multiple provisions that provide for the use and
sion to the Standing Committee examining the bill. 105 disclosure of information without the consent of the
data subject. A number of these provincial exemptionsThe preceding sections, devoted to explicating and
are motivated by other public policy concerns, such ascomparing the federal and provincial statutes in respect
permitting the exchange of information in order to pro-of personal (medical) information, have laid the ground-
vide medical treatment, allowing for the collection ofwork for engaging in the analysis, taken up in the next
data that can be used for performance evaluation of thepart of this paper, of whether health information protec-
health care system, facilitating research, and detectingtion legislation in Canada is best characterized as con-
fraud, among other things.cerned about privacy or personal data protection.
But individuals, given the rather personal nature of
health information, usually perceive a substantial interestHealth Information Protection:
in maintaining the privacy of this type of information.Privacy or Personal Data Protection? One of the dilemmas for legislative schemes that regu-
lthough an exhaustive discussion of all of the provi- late health information is therefore how to guard per-A sions contained within the four provincial Acts is sonal information, when its protection runs up against
beyond the scope of this paper, the areas highlighted in access interests and requirements, in a manner that rec-
the previous section do reflect the most substantive ele- onciles these competing policy goals. In this context
ments of each piece of legislation. While each of the Gostin has concluded, ‘‘one of the burdens of achieving
provincial Acts reflects the ‘‘fair information practices’’ cost effective and accessible [health] care is a loss of pri-
embodied in the OECD Guidelines and CSA Code, vacy’’. 107 Though certainly present in the PIPEDA, the
these are sectoral pieces of legislation designed to address provincial Acts demonstrate a greater tension between
exclusively the health care industry. The provincial Acts access to information and the privacy of personal health
make no distinction between commercial and non-com- information that appears characteristic of personal data
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One area of the debate particularly demonstrative of dence to determine whether the legislated balance goes
this strain revolves around medical research and the fears too far in either direction. Proponents of increased access
that a requirement to obtain informed and written con- to medical information forecast improvements to the
sent will stymie research through higher costs and overall health of the community. 112 Again, however,
greater administrative burden. Indeed, Gostin has argued more rigorous investigation is necessary if we are to
that increased amounts of available, accurate health determine whether the benefits that purportedly accrue
information would facilitate research. 108 This would be through greater access would offset the potential disad-
accomplished through the reduced cost of collecting and vantages that might adhere to the corresponding neces-
analyzing secondary data and through the increased sary reduction in autonomy and control over personal
trustworthiness and generalizability of the data given the information.
wider scope of collection. However, as Simitis has It should be clear from the foregoing analysis andexplained, personal information for research purposes discussion of these federal and provincial enactmentswill very often entail a use that does not correspond to that the provincial Acts go beyond the PIPEDA in pro-the original purpose for which the data were collected. 109 tecting personal health information. Nonetheless, thereFor this reason, he believes that, in such cases, legislation are similarities between these federal and provincial laws,must ensure that data subjects completely preserve their in terms of consent requirements and trade-offs betweenrights, meaning that personal information collected for protection and access, which undoubtedly are motivatedone purpose and subsequently used for research pur- by desires to keep the broader economy and healthposes should require informed consent. As a proponent sector functioning. For this reason, these statutes mightof informational self-determination, Simitis asserts that better be considered more about personal data protec-individuals should have the right to determine whether tion than about privacy.their information may be used for research and he is
critical of approaches to data protection that privilege
research. He questions, as lacking credible empirical Reconciling Canadian Legislation withproof, the oft-repeated mantra by the research commu- Neill’s Model nity that a consent requirement would increase the costs
of research and potentially skew results through reduced Having established that the Canadian legislation
sample size and selection bias. On the contrary, he cites examined in this paper is more aptly considered protec-
experiences in Germany where such protection for the tive of personal data than privacy, and that the provincial
data subject increased both cooperation rates and data Acts offer more protection of personal health informa-
reliability. 110 tion than does the PIPEDA, a concomitant question
arises as to whether the federal and provincial statutesThe deliberate balance between privacy and access, are aligned with Neill’s model? If so, where would theylegislated into the provincial health information Acts be situated on the privacy–personal data protection con-and the federal PIPEDA, which reflects the tension found tinuum, that was developed based upon Neill’s ontologywithin the Hippocratic Oath, discussed at the outset of of privacy rights?this paper, demonstrates that all are closer to personal
data protection than to privacy. Indeed, it is quite telling While the PIPEDA does bestow the force of Cana-
that all of these statutes regulate how information may dian law upon ‘‘fair information practices’’, it is here
be collected, used, and disclosed, rather than whether argued that the rights outlined by the Act are void of the
such actions should be permitted in the first place. 111 moral legitimation integral to Neill’s privacy model.
After all, if they were motivated exclusively by a desire to They do not derive from absolute, static norms based on
safeguard privacy, they would contain extremely limited the innate natural properties of the ‘‘sacred self’’. Instead,
access provisions based on explicit consent by the infor- the federal Act is strongly motivated by commercial
mation subject. Put another way, if these statutes were imperatives. This is made most evident by the Act’s reli-
concerned predominantly with privacy, they would priv- ance on the CSA Code, which closely resembles the
ilege this goal, to the near exclusion of access. However, OECD Guidelines in the latter’s attempt to strike a bal-
to varying degrees, they all seek to strike a balance ance between personal data protection and the free flow
between the protection of personal information and of information for business purposes. Similarly, the fact
access, which is, in fact, consistent with Neill’s model. that the development and passage of the Act was in large
Indeed, although Neill does not explicitly employ the part motivated by concerns about trade between Canada
language of access, she does assert, that personal informa- and the EU, as discussed previously, offers further evi-
tion, including health information, that is not protective dence of the commercial elements driving the PIPEDA.
of the ‘‘sacred self’’ may legitimately be used for decision- Indeed, the preamble to the Act states that the PIPEDA is
making purposes. Thus, Neill’s model helps to explain ‘‘[a]n Act to support and promote electronic commerce
and make sense of the nature of contemporary medical by protecting personal information that is collected, used
information protection legislation, including the trade- or disclosed in certain circumstances. . . .’’. 113 Moreover,
offs contained within. The relative youth of these Acts the stated purpose of Part 1 (Protection of Personal Infor-
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. . . to establish, in an era in which technology increasingly separate placement of each, although a systematic expli-
facilitates the circulation and exchange of information, rules cation of the differences between the four provincial Acts
to govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal goes beyond the scope of this paper. Indeed, since theyinformation in a manner that recognizes the right to privacy
ultimately all seek to balance protection of personalof individuals with respect to their personal information
and the need of organizations to collect, use or disclose health information with other policy objectives, it seems
personal information for purposes that a reasonable person realistic to group them together for purposes of this
would consider appropriate in the circumstances. 114 paper.
Federal privacy protection for personal information in
As discussed above, Neill asserts that only informa-the private sector, therefore assumes an instrumental
tion of the body, which is considered to reflect thecharacter, in service of the true legislative goal of facili-
‘‘sacred self’’, deserves privacy protection. Yet, the med-tating electronic commerce.
ical information that is safeguarded by each of the pro-The PIPEDA is thus quite candid about its intended
vincial Acts includes both mental and physical informa-purpose and does not presume to safeguard privacy
tion and is therefore both of and about the body.under the rubric of the ‘‘sacred self’’. It is clear that the
According to Neill, however, only the mental healthtrade-offs in the legislation endeavour to satisfy com-
information, of the body, would warrant privacy protec-peting public policy goals in an attempt to ensure that
tion based upon an appeal to the ‘‘sacred self’’. Again, it isCanada continues to profit in the ‘‘ information
important to recall that Neill does not argue againsteconomy’’. Rather than appealing to a fundamental
providing any protection for physical health informationsense of privacy and the necessity of ensuring its protec-
(about the body), rather she argues that the justificationtion, the Act specifies a purpose of balancing personal
for any such safeguards must be made with reference todata protection against commercial interests. As such, the
values other than privacy protection. Indeed, the mul-provisions of the federal Act revolve around what Neill
tiple, and seemingly incongruous, policy goals of thesewould classify as broad rights to a private life and trade
provincial health information protection Acts appear totransgressions, and thus, more aptly, are considered pro-
attempt to strike a balance between access and privacy,tective of personal data rather than the privacy of the
making it clear that protection of the ‘‘sacred self’’ is not‘‘sacred self’’. Indeed, the rights enumerated by the
the overarching objective. Instead, each Act appears toPIPEDA are certainly not protective of Neill’s conception
consider privacy in terms of its instrumental value. Theof the ‘‘sacred self’’, but neither do they make that claim.
various provisions of the statutes are premised on utilita-The attempt by the Act to legislate some level of data
rian concerns about maintaining the patient–health careprotection without couching it in terms of a funda-
provider relationship, advocating and offering autonomymental appeal to the dignity of privacy is certainly in line
to individuals over their own information, and perhapswith Neill’s model. For these reasons the PIPEDA would
preventing economic harm and the humiliation of indi-clearly not be positioned at the left side of the pri-
vidual patients. The exemptions and limitations writtenvacy–personal data protection continuum. Nonetheless,
into each piece of legislation, which actually reduce pri-there remains the question of where to situate this
vacy protection, are ostensibly designed to benefit societystatute vis-à-vis the OECD Guidelines and EU Data Pro-
by facilitating information flow within the health caretection Directive. Since the federal Act is so closely allied
system. Insofar as this concerns physical health informa-with the OECD Guidelines, the obvious choice for the
tion, the provincial Acts align with Neill’s model. But theplacement of the former on the continuum is parallel to
provincial health information protection Acts fail to dif-the latter, as outlined in Figure 4.
ferentiate between mental and physical health informa-
Figure 4 — Location of the PIPEDA on the Pri- tion. Thus, the instrumental treatment of mental health
vacy–Personal Data Protection Continuum information under the provincial Acts fails to align with
a position close to the ‘‘sacred self’’ that Neill would
afford this type of information in her model. Based upon
the overall wording and effects of the provincial Acts, it
can be argued that health protection legislation in
Canada finds a place at the fluctuating norms and pro-
tection of broad privacy rights level of Neill’s ontology.
While this allies with Neill’s model in terms of the treat-
ment of physical health information, the inclusion of
mental health information at this level of protection is
difficult to reconcile with her ontology of privacy rights.
In contrast, the provincial legislative protections Since the provincial health Acts treat both mental
offered in respect of personal health information in and physical health information without making a dis-
Canada, are more difficult to align with Neill’s model. tinction, it is also difficult to assign them on the pri-
Moreover, an argument could be advanced that differ- vacy–data protection continuum vis-à-vis the PIPEDA,
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seemingly obvious solution would be to separate and information and the European Union–PIPEDA–OECD
place physical and mental health information protection Guidelines grouping, as outlined in Figure 5.
at different points on the spectrum, as was done with the Figure 5 — Location of the Provincial Health Informa-
EU Data Protection Directive. However, the provincial tion Protection Acts on the Privacy–Personal Data Pro-
Acts treat both types of health information similarly, tection Continuum
whereas the EU Data Protection Directive confers a dis-
tinct status upon health and sex life information. It
would therefore be analytically incorrect to split the pro-
vincial Acts into different places on the continuum.
Since we have established that none of the provin-
cial laws completely protect the privacy of the ‘‘sacred
self’’, although this would be appropriate for mental
health information according to Neill’s model, an alter-
native solution might be to locate the provincial Acts at a
position adjacent to the other data protection instru-
ments scrutinized in this paper. Indeed, based upon
Neill’s typology there is nothing about the physical
health information that these provincial Acts strive to
protect that would merit a greater claim to privacy than Conclusion 
the commercial information safeguarded by the PIPEDA,
his paper has sought to explore the relationship andEU Data Protection Directive, or OECD Guidelines. T tension between the privacy and access interestsTherefore, situating the provincial Acts closer to the data
inherent in contemporary legislative mechanisms thatprotection side of the continuum would avoid ascribing
regulate the collection, use, and disclosure of personala special status to physical medical information that is
information in Canada. Elizabeth Neill’s ontology of pri-not justified by Neill’s model. This placement would also
vacy rights provided the theoretical underpinnings tocertainly account for the competing policy goals of the
analyze and situate certain Canadian legislation cur-legislation, which are reflected in the numerous exemp-
rently involved in regulating this relationship. The expli-tions designed to facilitate access to personal informa-
cation of Neill’s model demonstrated that she considerstion. However, such a resolution would ignore the pro-
human dignity to be a metaphor that assumes a dualvincial protection afforded mental health information,
role; it reflects the innate natural properties of privacywhich in Neill’s model merits privacy protection due to
and autonomy, and, based on these original, innateits association with the ‘‘sacred self’’. Given this, and
properties, it provides the moral justification for con-despite the utilitarian nature of the provincial statutes, I
structing societal norms protective of privacy. This con-would situate the provincial Acts closer to the European
ceptual construct allows Neill to differentiate betweenUnion treatment of health information than to the
the broad right to a private life and narrow rights toPIPEDA, EU Data Protection Directive, or OECD Guide-
inherent privacy and human dignity. The former arelines. By way of qualification, however, the equal treat-
protected through conventional fluctuating norms, whilement given to physical health information by the provin-
the latter are safeguarded by natural, conventional staticcial legislation and the fact that the protection afforded
norms. Transgressions of these static norms, based uponmental health information is subject to exemptions, mili-
narrow rights, represent violations of innate privacy andtates against placing these Acts to the left side of the
the individual dignity of the ‘‘sacred self’’. According toEuropean Union health information. In other words,
Neill, it is only these rights that warrant protection basedplacing the provincial Acts too far to the left on the
upon an appeal to privacy. Broader rights, although cer-continuum would seem motivated by an implicit
tainly susceptible to transgression, may not be defendedassumption that medical information warrants special
through reference to privacy. It is precisely this distinc-attention and protection, as compared to ‘‘commercial’’
tion that provided the basis for developing the pri-information. But according to Neill’s model such an
vacy–data protection continuum, upon which theassumption would, in general, be wrong and could only
various legislative devices examined in the paper werebe defended in respect of mental health information.
situated.Yet, precisely because the provincial statutes offer quali-
fied protection to mental health information, they must It was found that the privacy protection offered by
be positioned closer to the privacy protection of the the OECD Guidelines, the EU Data Protection Directive,
‘‘sacred self’’ than the other statutes and guidelines and the PIPEDA cannot claim to protect the privacy of
already situated on the continuum. To the extent that the ‘‘sacred self’’. In fact, with perhaps the exception of
the provincial Acts cover mental health information but the European Union treatment of health and sex life
also permit qualified exceptions, they should be posi- information, none of these three data protection instru-
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privacy as its predominant justification and purpose, part of the health care system in order to facilitate more
which is very much in line with Neill’s model. All seek to effective health care provision, to evaluate the quality
establish some level of personal data protection while and cost effectiveness of health services, to monitor abuse
also facilitating trade and commerce. Thus, these statu- and fraud, to track disease, and to research patterns of
tory devices align more closely with broader claims to disease for prevention and treatment purposes. Although
privacy, whose ontological status would place them such a perspective, which encompasses significant com-
nearer to the data protection side than to the privacy side munitarian elements, might perhaps reify system values
of the continuum. All were therefore characterized as at the expense of patient rights to privacy, the tension
more protective of personal data than of privacy. between privacy and access is not as absolute as one
might think, since both individual and social imperativesThe comparative examination of the PIPEDA and
will often intersect in the realm of health informationthe four provincial Acts in respect of health information
protection. 115demonstrated that while there are similarities, the prov-
inces go further in protecting personal health informa- In this context it became clear that the epistemic
tion than does the federal legislation. Nonetheless, each strength of Neill’s ontology of privacy rights rests with its
of the provincial statutes, similar to the PIPEDA, also ability to disentangle the conceptual underbrush associ-
demonstrated concern with policy goals beyond the pro- ated with the notion of privacy. The guidance offered by
tection of privacy. The analysis made it clear that the her model for determining valid privacy claims helps
provincial Acts attempt to balance the protection of per- illustrate whether contemporary privacy legislation is
sonal information against competing policy goals that motivated more by privacy or personal data protection
oftentimes require access to information. Although the concerns. This, in turn, helps to explain why society
provincial Acts demonstrated a utilitarian nature with might accept the trade-offs between data protection and
regard to privacy that aligns with Neill’s model, and is access inherent in all these legislative devices. By effec-
similar to the PIPEDA, their dual treatment of mental tively identifying the boundaries of what is and what is
and physical health information rendered their place- not privacy, Neill’s model helps to debunk some of the
ment on the privacy–data protection continuum some- rhetoric about the presumed absolute nature of privacy
what problematic. Neill’s model, which does not privi- rights that invariably gets caught up in policy discussions
lege medical information about the body, would about legislative protections. Indeed, by cutting through
generally require that the provincial Acts be situated the rhetoric involved in the debate, Neill helps to bring
closer to personal data protection than to the privacy clarity to the complexity of information policy and its
side of the continuum. However, since all of the provin- development in the ‘‘information age’’. Perhaps by
cial statutes offer qualified protection to mental informa- accepting that privacy has a rather narrow conceptual
tion of the body, they also safeguard an element of the justification, we can better comprehend the nature and
‘‘sacred self’’ and thus privacy. For this reason the provin- value of the personal data protection legislation being
cial Acts were ultimately situated on the left side of the enacted around us. While a libertarian might bristle at
privacy–data protection continuum. the degree to which communitarians, like Etzioni,
The overall analysis revealed an inherent tension emphasize social virtue at the expense of individual
between privacy and access in all data protection laws, autonomy, this type of analysis does highlight an impor-
although it was most pronounced in the medical infor- tant aspect of public policy development; namely, that
mation protection statutes. Part of this tension stems societies are almost always unable to make perfect
from the nature of the medical environment, which choices since there will usually be a degree to which one
depends upon accurate, current and complete health interest trumps another. This is the area where Elizabeth
data in order to function effectively. Indeed, patients, Neill’s work could prove most useful; by delineating the
health care providers, researchers, policymakers and all bounds of what qualifies as a legitimate privacy claim,
others with a stake in the system require quality informa- her model might bring clarity to the public policy pro-
tion in order to make informed decisions. It thus cess in which legislators must respond to competing
becomes obvious that access to information is an integral demands for protection and access.
Notes:
1 cf. Paul S. Appelbaum, ‘‘Privacy in Psychiatric Treatment: Threats and 2 OECD, Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Responses’’ (2002) 159 American Journal of Psychiatry 1809, in which Personal Data (Paris: OECD, 1981) [OECD Guidelines].
Appelbaum discusses the importance of privacy in the context of psychi-
atric counselling. Lawrence Gostin discusses the tension between ensuring 3 EC, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
patient privacy and the goals and needs of the health care system in 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Lawrence O. Gostin, ‘‘Health Information Privacy’’ (1995) 80 Cornell L. Processing of Personal Data and On the Free Movement of Such Data,
Rev. 451. Peter Jacobson has also analyzed the difficulty of balancing [1995] O.J. L. 281/31 [EU Data Protection Directive].
patient privacy and the information needs of the medical system in Peter
D. Jacobson, ‘‘Medical Records and HIPAA: Is It Too Late To Protect 4 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000,
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